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Abstract  
This article revisits the multiple terrorist attacks that took place in England 
in 2017 and, through a closer examination of the narratives of the eight 
male perpetrators of these attacks, it draws the readers’ attention to the 
flaws in state and non-state responses to fundamentalist mobilisations. 
The article works with Karima Bennoune’s (2008) radical universalist 
approach to highlight the importance of a human rights framework for 
tackling fundamentalism. This is positioned against a neo-liberal and 
nationalist state response and a reactive left/anti-racist response in order 
to make visible the connections between terror and torture and also the 
myopia of a response that emphasises an obligation to either respect or 
ensure rights rather than both simultaneously. This is particularly 
underlined within the final section where a discussion of gender 
perspectives on tackling fundamentalism distinguishes between the 
human right to security, an important concern for feminists involved in 
ending violence against women and girls, and the government’s protection 
of its own interests through securitisation. In keeping with the conjoined 
objectives of the piece, the final section offers a simultaneous critique of 
non-state actors for whom every state intervention on fundamentalism, 
and every feminist engagement with the state, is sullied by the accusation 
of ‘securitisation’. 
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  Introduction 
After a ten year hiatus, in 2017 Islamist terrorism once again made its presence 
felt on the streets of the UK. The year began with news of the suicide bombing 
by Jamil al Harith, a prominent Manchester based ISIS operative and a former 
Guantanamo detainee. Then, alongside images of British nationals, including 
young female ‘jihadi brides’, leaving the UK to fight for the so called Islamic 
State, five terrorist attacks in the space of five months - Westminster 
(22/03/2017), Manchester (22/05/2017), London Bridge (3/06/2017), Finsbury 
Park (19/06/2017), and Putney Green (19/09/2017) – became a stark reminder 
of the ongoing recruitment of British nationals to a violent Salafi-Jihadist 
ideological world view and the co-terminus rise and rise of racism. The 
personal-political narratives of eight men set the mood music for discussions 
on pathways into and the prevention of terrorism. Their stories provide key 
insights into the array of issues and tactics with which counter-terrorism 
measures now need to contend but also highlight the immense flaws and 
inconsistencies in the British state’s counter-terrorism work.   
Gender was right at the heart of these discussions. The Manchester bomber, 
Salman Abedi, specifically targeted the concert of a young female singer with 
a largely female fan base; the majority of those killed on 22nd May 2017 were 
women and girls condemned by Abedi for their ‘immoral western’ lifestyles. 
Following the Manchester attack, the former Chief Prosecutor, Nazir Afzal, 
who had previously used the term ‘gender terrorism’ to talk about child sexual 
exploitation and honour-based violence, began applying this term to Muslim 
fundamentalism. Nimco Ali, the feminist campaigner against female genital 
mutilation, connected the dots across white supremacist and Islamisti attacks 
by diagnosing these as a problem of ‘toxic masculinity’ while the feminist 
journalist Joan Smith used the term ‘misogyny’ to connect a range of male 
perpetrated mass killings (in the UK and in the USA) with the perpetrators’ 
individual histories of intimate partner violence. Moreover, women and girls 
were implicated in these supremacist gender orders. Questions were posed 
about complicity as we got to know more about Jamil al Harith through 
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interviews with his wife. We heard of the death of one of three ‘jihadi brides’ 
who had travelled from the London borough of Tower Hamlets to Syria and 
public attention once again turned to female recruiters and female recruits. 
On the other hand, Islamists and left leaning academics attacked Muslim 
women who decided to work with government, through the Prevent agenda, 
to tackle fundamentalism within their own communities. 
... 
This article is informed by Karima Bennoune’s (2008) radical universalist 
approach to tackling both terror and torture but also borne of the legacy of 
Women Against Fundamentalism’s writing and activism. I attempt to push the 
reader to think simultaneously from an anti-racist, anti-fundamentalist, 
feminist position within the context of a highly polarised debate. In doing so, I 
critically engage with the landscape on which Prevent is rhetorically advocated 
and implemented, by acknowledging the importance of challenging 
fundamentalism in all religions, without conceding to either civil society denial 
or state over reach, and with the objective of holding both state and non-state 
actors to account.  
The article begins with an introduction to Karima Bennoune’s (2008) important 
reminder of the bi-focal obligation of human rights – to ensure rights and 
respect rights – and the many ways that this dual duty is compromised within 
the circle of indignity that connects terror and torture. I position this 
commitment to a human rights approach as in conflict with nationalist and 
neo-liberal responses to terrorism. In the first section, I voice antipathy for the 
displacement of an important emergent 1980s debate about ‘fundamentalism’ 
with a far less coherent conceptualisation of ‘extremism’, particularly the way 
it is bound to patriotism, integration, and individualised risk assessments. If 
this first section is a focus on problems with the state’s framing of the issues, 
the following section highlights the myopia of non-state actors that focus on 
state over reach and push against any serious consideration of the threat 
posed by non-state actors engaged in terror and torture. This part of the 
argument highlights the importance of a feminist ethics that can distinguish 
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between supremacist, authoritarian projects and liberatory ones. The final 
section focuses on gender in order to draw out the tensions in getting both 
state and non-state actors to value and defend security as a human right. On 
the one hand, civil society actors accuse the state (and whoever engages with 
government) of ‘securitisation’ whenever government takes up its 
responsibility to tackle fundamentalism. On the other hand, the British state 
rescinds its duty to protect all its citizens and frequently falls back on 
securitisation, particularly the use of immigration controls, to ultimately 
protect the interests of the nation-state over and above the rights of its 
citizens.  
Radical universalism vs nationalism and neo liberal governance 
In 2008, in the wake of academic and activist campaigning around 
Guantanamo and refashioned arguments about the manipulation of women’s 
and LGBT rights in the service of imperial power, Karima Bennoune – then a 
Rutgers Law Professor and now the UN Special Rapporteur for Cultural Rights 
– developed a bold and brave new critique of state and NGO responses to 
fundamentalism. In her paper ‘Terror/Torture’, Bennoune (2008) argued that 
both fundamentalist terrorism and the state’s response to this are bound 
together by the same philosophical tenets, both are an incursion on people’s 
human rights and they often involve the same acts. These acts are intended to 
cause ‘severe and deliberate human suffering’, they dehumanise their victims, 
they both ‘represent a spectrum of brutalising practices often justified in the 
name of a greater good or higher purpose’ (Bennoune, 2008: 17). Moreover, 
they violate the right to bodily autonomy, to freedom of conscience and 
expression and they both sever ‘all bonds of human sympathy’ between those 
engaged in torture or terror and those being tortured or terrorised (Bennoune, 
2008: 7, footnote 21). Although state and non-state actors portray terror and 
torture as dichotomous categories, they are in fact ‘points on the 
circumference of the same circle: terror/torture, terror/counter-terror, 
security/human rights, state action/non-state action’ - as one side brutalises, 
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the other side rescinds the rule of law which in turn leads to a violation of 
rights, and so on and so forth (Bennoune, 2008: 9). 
Bennoune argues that to counter this circle of dehumanisation, all state and 
non-state bodies need to focus on creating a ‘circle of decency’ and indeed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obliges states to 
both ensure rights and respect rights. However, she explains that:  
In our time of terror, security experts usually emphasize the aspect of 
ensuring rights (though not often using such language) while human 
rights advocates largely focus on respecting rights (though they usually 
at least acknowledge, en passant, that governments must protect their 
populations). The trick, which neither side in the debate has adequately 
referenced, is that states have to do both - respect rights and ensure 
rights - and at the same time.  
[Bennoune, 2008: 10] 
 
In ensuring rights, the British state has a duty to protect its population from 
‘violent attack by non-state armed groups’ but, at the same time, it ‘must not 
itself contravene the rights guaranteed in the ICCPR’ (Bennoune, 2008: 10). 
Unfortunately, campaigns against state injustices powerfully illustrate the 
British government’s failure to respect rights while it claims to undertake 
activities to ensure rights. Sadly, there are more examples than space permits 
within this article, but touchstones include the British government’s 
involvement in extraordinary rendition, deaths in police custody, the use of 
control orders to curtail freedom of movement, the use of immigration 
controls to deport jihadists (including to countries where they face 
persecution) and the use of immigration controls to stop young people who 
travelled to Syria and Iraq from returning to the UK.  
Moreover, Amnesty International UK’s (2016) submission to the UN Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review lists the current government’s 
‘hostile environment’ and immigration detention practices as one of the key 
human rights issues in the UK. The same report raises concerns about the ways 
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that new security measures – such as the Investigatory Powers Act – infringe 
on the right to privacy and freedom of expression. At the time of writing, there 
is a groundswell of support for the Stansted 15 who were convicted under the 
Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 and the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 for using non-violent protest methods to stop a charter flight 
being used to deport asylum claimants to Nigeria and Ghana.ii This case is a 
clear illustration of the way that the state uses security claims and security 
legislation to enable deportation and suppress anti-deportation / human rights 
activism. 
As Chetan Bhatt (2012) has pointed out, these developments are taking place 
within a techno-geo-political context where state over reach is now 
characterised by drone strikes and multi-layered insidious intrusions into 
governance structures, or shells of structures, within other countries (justified 
on the grounds that they are ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states), while jihadists scatter 
their attacks across a range of geographical territories utilising a wide range of 
tactics and tools. The rules of war have changed as both state and opponent 
claim that everywhere is a battlefield (Reiner, 2018). Consequently, it has 
become usual for western states to claim that the use of extra-judicial 
measures is a necessary act for protecting the security of their populations - 
the assassinations of prominent Al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Anwar 
Al Awlaki, were defended with recourse to the language of war and a claim to 
ensuring rights while at the same time completely obliterating out of any 
recognition the simultaneous obligation on states to respect rights.  
On the other hand, human rights, anti-racist and left activist circles have largely 
glossed over the terrorist supremacist ideologies and networks of former 
Guantanamo prisoners and other Islamist activists and instead depicted them 
as virtuous victims harassed by the insidious practices of security services 
(Bhatt, 2017). When faced with the struggle between global fundamentalist 
forces and western imperial powers, these groups and movements make 
ethical choices to present ‘salafi-jihadis and their supporters as bewildered 
victims unburdened with ideology, volition or agency… (for instance) in the 
case of Aafia Siddiquiiii, it is not simply that human rights organisations focused 
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on ‘torture’, but that they actively worked to make ‘terror’ disappear, remade 
its ideologues into virtuous figures’ (Bhatt, 2017: 7).  Such a perspective sees 
power only in relation to western states and the progressive struggle only in 
relation to fighting imperialism (ibid). 
Karima Bennoune similarly argued that this is typical of a human rights 
discourse that ‘minimises discussion of ensuring rights to protection from 
terrorist violence by the enforcement of international law’ (2008: 10) and is 
largely focused on campaigns directed at nation states and their obligation to 
respect rights.  
  
Some would argue that international human rights are now a central part of 
globalised governance and there are similarities between the fundamentalist 
recourse to human rights as legal innocence and the neo-liberal 
instrumentalization of a human rights language as both have been emptied of 
any ‘progressive visionary content’ (Bhatt 2017: 18). Nonetheless, in this 
article, I draw a clear distinction between a radical universalist rights-based 
response to fundamentalist mobilisations and a response that is mired by 
nationalism and the managerial tools of neo-liberal governance, which have in 
turn relied on communal forces.  
In the context of a globalised world, the nation-state is impacted by (and 
impacts) international governance structures which have become increasingly 
dominated by the drive to instil neo-liberal political economy (Sassen, 1996) in 
a context where the power of capital is intensified (Hall, 2011). The privileging 
of neo-liberal economic interests over social welfare and social democracy has 
seeped into the very fabric of our culture, our language, ethics and daily 
practices (Hall, 2011) while western governments develop management tools 
akin to insurance firms to ameliorate the risks of global traffic, both material 
and virtual (Rose, 1999). 
In the face of global transformations, the nation state retains its autonomy, 
authority and legitimacy by strengthening its executive over judicial and 
legislative wings (Sassen, 2004) but when people resist the growing power of 
the executive, government relies on nationalist fervour to get through these 
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crises of governmentality and governability (Yuval-Davis, 2012). These trends 
are really evident right now with a Conservative government pushing against 
international human rights conventions, relying on a crude recourse to 
immigration controls and nationalist scripts (the ‘hostile environment’ and 
‘British values’), and an over reliance on punitive measures for tackling social 
problems so that it can continue to squeeze the life out of the welfare state. 
Moreover, these tendencies are particularly clear in the British Prevent 
agenda.  
 
Nationalism, neo-liberalism and Prevent 
Since its birth in 2005 to the events of 2017, the Prevent agenda was much less 
a political argument against right wing formations and much more a 
combination of patriotic expectation and neo-liberal managerialism. In 
Opposition, the Conservative Party election campaign oriented around three 
key distinctions from New Labour: to stop state funding of Islamist groups 
(there has never been a statement about other religious fundamentalists); to 
ensure that Prevent money is used for focused counter-terror work rather than 
generic cohesion / social development activities; and to tackle the ideological 
shifts that enable fundamentalist activity by looking at ‘extremism’ and not just 
‘violent extremism’. 
However, there have been several continuities between the New Labour and 
Conservative Party approaches to fundamentalism in the way they have been 
defined more by the interests of the nation-state (nationalism) and the power 
of capital (neo-liberalism) than by a commitment to respecting and ensuring 
rights. Firstly, although the current definition of extremism appears to be 
located within human rights and anti-discrimination commitments, it 
continues to emphasise loyalty to the British state and does so in a context 
where the current PM Theresa May is issuing conflicting messages about the 
government’s commitment to human rights – on the one hand she is 
advocating a Domestic Abuse Bill that will ratify the Istanbul Convention, on 
the other she has been a vociferous opponent of the Human Rights Act and is 
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complicit in the decimation of resources (e.g. legal aid) and support services 
that assist people to activate those rights.  
 
Throughout the New Labour years, Prevent was wedded to the Community 
Cohesion and Integration agenda. The potential for a human rights framework 
was jettisoned in favour of chauvinistic ‘British’ pride. As the SBS/WAF (2007) 
submission to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion spelt out then and 
is still relevant now, government discourse assumed that ‘there are a set of 
fixed and given (unchanging) ‘British’ values that are superior and to which all 
those who enter the country must subscribe’ (p.2). The absence of any 
acknowledgement of the contribution of minorities, including Muslim activists, 
to the development of human rights and equality principles ‘reinforces the 
distorted and dangerous view peddled by many in the media and western 
governments and mirrored by fundamentalists, that the battle lines are 
between the West and Islam’ (SBS/WAF, 2007: 4). 
This recourse to ‘British values’ involved a renewed pressure on minorities to 
‘integrate’ and to demonstrate their loyalty to the British state (see Tony Blair’s 
speech 8/12/2006 ‘The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values’). At the time, 
Sivanandan (2006) astutely observed that the war on asylum had merged with 
the war on terror – ‘race riots’ and religious violence became part of the 
projection of second or third generation ethnic minorities, particularly 
Muslims, as immigrants in need of integration rather than as established 
British citizens that had contributed to the struggle for human rights and 
equality. The state’s response to fundamentalist recruitment completely 
sidestepped discussions on racism, poverty, class inequality, and foreign policy 
in favour of cultural and behavioural arguments placing the onus on minorities 
to ‘integrate’. 
This emphasis on British values and integration has continued under the 
Conservative Party; the revised Prevent Strategy (2011) defined extremism as 
follows: 
‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
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tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our 
definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed 
forces, whether in this country or overseas'. 
 [HM Government, 2011: 107]  
 
BME feminists are caught between a rock and a hard place as Theresa May has 
opened up space for conversations about gender and fundamentalism that 
simply didn’t exist under New Labour, particularly by establishing a 
Commission on Countering Extremism steered by the BME feminist Sara Khan 
and a group of academics and activists with strong track records of defending 
human rights, equalities and civil liberties. However, the Conservative Party’s 
interest in gender inequality is tarnished by its destabilisation of citizenship - 
British minorities continue to be treated as immigrants sandwiched between a 
‘hostile environment’ and a ‘culture clash’. 
Integration (or lack of) continues as a feature of mainstream assumptions 
about extremism in the UK and as an element of the current Conservative 
government’s Prevent agenda. Louise Casey’s (2016) report on opportunity 
and integration reflects many of these assumptions – she leans towards 
assimiliationism by focusing primarily on ethnic minorities while 
simultaneously ignoring the rising tide of white fascist extremism, which is 
pinned to the same claims of authentic British identity and values. She also 
advocates the teaching of ‘British values, laws and history’ without cognisance 
of the spoils of colonialism.  
Recent campaigns against gender segregation have been important for 
highlighting separatist tendencies among fundamentalists and the ways that 
they enforce unequal gender roles, cloister and control women and girls within 
minority communities (see Patel, 2018). However, the presumption by 
government and others that extremists are in part defined by their inability / 
unwillingness to integrate conceals many truths about the British state and 
about fundamentalist activity. Under New Labour, Islamists were notoriously 
given Prevent funding for anti-radicalisation work and consulted by police 
forces in England (see Maher and Frampton, 2009) but they were not the only 
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ones. The New Labour government claimed as ‘moderate’ those 
fundamentalist organisations (such as the Muslim Council of Britain, Hindu 
Forum and the Sikh Federation) who appeared to be ‘integrated’ because of 
their engagement with democratic lobbying tactics and electoral politics and 
their use of human rights language. As Sahgal (2016) highlighted more 
recently, this relationship with fundamentalist forces continued under the last 
two Conservative governments. Moreover, fundamentalist groups have long 
since been able to mainstream their religious interpretations and practices by 
being ‘integrated’ into local multi-faith forums and Standing Advisory Council 
on Religious Education (SACREs).iv As is obvious from the examples discussed 
in the next two sections, fundamentalists strive to impose ideological projects 
of separatism and superiority but they do this through full engagement with 
social and political institutions in the public realm.  
The British state continues to engage with fundamentalist groups across 
shared interests (see, for example, Sahgal, 2016; but also unintentionally 
highlighted by O’ Toole et al. (2015) in their review of state-Muslim 
governance). In most part, this alignment of interests concerns a moralistic 
pre-occupation with policing women, young people, minority communities, 
illegality and criminality (see Dhaliwal, 2011 and Dhaliwal, forthcoming). 
Drawing on Naomi Goldenberg’s (2013) theory of religions as vestigial states, I 
have argued that government happily overlooks ‘extremism’ so long as its 
fundamentalist partners do not pose a threat to its monopoly on violence 
(ibid).v As I’ve explained elsewhere (see Dhaliwal, 2011, 2017 and 
forthcoming), the continuities between New Labour and the Conservative 
Party can also be seen in their mobilisation of communal identities and 
fundamentalist formulations wherever communitarianism can assist the 
project of the neo-liberal shrinking of the welfare state. In short, these features 
of contemporary governance mean that a claim to tackling extremism is 
compounded by contrary interests (nationalist and neo-liberal not to mention 
long standing local networks) that have come to depend on extremist 
formations.  
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Moreover, an agenda that shifts attention from human rights to the 
pathologising discourses of integration fits neatly with risk assessment tools 
that emphasise individual behaviour and rectitude without contending with 
the structures and contexts that, although not the cause of fundamentalist 
activism, have nonetheless enabled right wing formations and agendas to 
flourish.  
The Prevent programme is delivered as a package. The Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015 introduced a legal duty on public sector bodies to ‘have due 
regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ during 
the exercise of their functions (HM Government, 2015a). Due regard means 
that ‘the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the 
need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the 
other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions’ (HM 
Government, 2015a: 5). To fulfil this Duty they are expected to perform a risk 
assessment, produce an action plan, train staff and collaborate with other 
areas. Contrary to popular beliefs, this is not a duty on individual employees 
but on organisations and local authorities as a whole.  
Connected to this new statutory Prevent Duty is the Conservative 
government’s updated Channel programme guidance (HM Government, 
2015b). The Channel programme was first piloted in 2007 by New Labour. It 
was rolled out by the Coalition government in 2012. The Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015 set out ‘the duty of local authorities and partners of local 
panels to provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism’ 
(HM Government, 2015b: 2). Channel panels are expected to be part of multi-
agency responses by: ‘a. identifying individuals at risk; b. assessing the nature 
and extent of that risk; and c. developing the most appropriate support plan 
for the individuals concerned’ (HM Government, 2015b: 5). This support plan 
can range from mentoring, life skills coaching, anger management sessions, 
cognitive behavioural work, something referred to as ‘constructive pursuits’ 
which includes leisure activities, education training and careers guidance, 
family support work including parenting programmes, health awareness 
training, housing support, and drugs and alcohol awareness training. The 
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guidance also states that ‘where an individual has a need for theological / 
ideological support, Home Office approved intervention providers must be 
commissioned to mentor them. The mentoring aims to increase theological 
understanding and challenge extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise 
terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015b: 17). 
There are several contributions within this Special Issue (such as Parker, 
Chapot and Davis), which demonstrate that Prevent funded initiatives and 
Channel Panel interventions comprise fairly innocuous educational, 
developmental and youth work. Moreover, Cowden and Picken (also in this 
Issue) emphasise the numbers of children and young people that have been 
averted from fundamentalist activism because of Channel panel interventions.  
While Channel guidance accepts that there is no single factor that makes 
someone vulnerable to radicalisation, it does provide a Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework (VAF) that is built around three criteria – engagement 
with a group, cause or ideology; intent to cause harm; capability to cause harm. 
From my perspective, the second two points are key for a human rights 
approach to tackling fundamentalism. However, matters are confused when 
the VAF is supported by as many as 22 factors (known as the ERG 22+) and 
professionals are asked to consider the following in making a referral for a 
Channel intervention: ‘feelings of grievance and injustice; feeling under threat; 
a need for identity, meaning and belonging; a desire for status;  a desire for 
excitement and adventure; a need to dominate and control others; 
susceptibility to indoctrination; a desire for political or moral change; 
opportunistic involvement; family or friends involvement in extremism; being 
at a transitional time of life; being influenced or controlled by a group; relevant 
mental health issues; over-identification with a group or ideology; ‘Them and 
Us’ thinking; dehumanisation of the enemy; attitudes that justify offending; 
harmful means to an end; harmful objectives; individual knowledge, skills and 
competencies; access to networks, funding or equipment; criminal capability’ 
(HM Government, 2015b: 28). Other than ‘criminal capability’, these indicators 
are wide ranging and many could apply to most young people in their 
formative years.  
Pre-print, accepted for publication on 8th March 2019 
 115 
 
 
It’s important to bring a critical lens to this process but a feminist critique 
needs to be clearly distinguished from that led by Cage (2016) in their report, 
The Science of Pre-Crime. As a fundamentalist organisation (see Tax, 2013 and 
Bhatt, 2017 for further details) their objectives are entirely different. Sadly, 
they have managed to harness the integrity of academic critiquevi in order to 
try and undermine necessary discussions of a role for the state in tackling 
fundamentalism. They seem to have convinced a huge range of academics that 
there is no Islamist recruitment taking place in the UK in spite of the shocking 
reality of terrorist attacks and of British nationals travelling abroad to join ISIS. 
This wide ranging support for the Cage position assumes that ISIS recruits are 
responding entirely to British foreign policy and/or imperialism rather than the 
fact that people are effectively targetted by ISIS recruiters and that those 
recruited subscribe to an authoritarian ideology.   
Instead, I take my lead from a number of feminist academics whose work to 
end violence against women has pointed to the ways that risk assessments  
(whose formula has been devised by the police) are flawed for the simple fact 
that risk is never static, it is dynamic, and therefore can not be subjected to a 
tick list approach, no matter how detailed (Coy and Kelly, 2011). Moreover, 
within contexts of dwindling public resources, there is considerable pressure 
to find ways to distinguish between high and low risk cases i.e. those that 
require an urgent response and those that can be de-prioritised, even though 
an incident classed as low risk may well be an indication of something more 
serious (Stark, 2009). In fact this is perfectly illustrated by the stories of the 
eight men responsible for the attacks in 2017 but also by the Deghayes 
brothers whose referral to Channel did not prevent their radicalisation (see 
Connett, 2017) because it did not address the multi-faceted problems 
confronting them - bullying and racism at school, poverty, domestic violence 
at home, an uncle that had been in Guantanamo and was released to an 
address near them that led to them being subjected to racist abuse but also 
exposed to Salafi-Jihadi ideology, their involvement in gangs, and their political 
views. An approach that encourages independent youth projects that are 
focused on advocating for universal human rights (against the racist and 
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fundamentalist assault on rights) at the same time that welfare needs are 
being met by the state, might be a better step in the right direction. 
 
In denial of Terror and Torture 
2017 began with the news that Jamil al Harith, a 50 year old British convert to 
Islam, was the suicide bomber at the centre of an explosion near the Iraqi city 
of Mosul (Rawlinson, 2017). He was known to ISIS as Abu Zakariya al-Britaini. 
He was known to his natal family as Ronald Fiddler. The plot thickened as press 
attention switched to the £1 million compensation awarded to Harith in 2010 
(while Theresa May was Home Secretary) for false imprisonment and torture 
at Guantanamo Bay (MacAskill et al., 2017). Harith had been detained without 
charge at Guantanamo for over two years. During this time, he had been 
subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, food and water deprivation, religious 
abuse, and daily humiliation during which he was forced to kneel in front of US 
officials. He was kept in a cage and shackled into a painful position for hours at 
a time. This treatment needs to be condemned. Whatever his crimes, Harith 
deserved to be treated as a human being with the right to food, shelter, 
accommodation and the right not to be tortured. 
However there is another side to the story. Harith had converted to Islam back 
in 1994, while he was in his twenties. Six years later, he travelled to Pakistan 
and claims to have been arrested by the Taliban as he was passing through 
Afghanistan on his way to Iran. Along with several other British nationals, he 
was picked up by US Army officials at an ex-Taliban prison in Kandahar in 2001 
(ibid). He claimed that while he was waiting for Red Cross officials to organise 
his return to the UK, US officials decided they didn’t believe his story, detained 
him as a ‘suspected enemy combatant’ and moved him to Guantanamo. A 
series of media outlets tracked Harith’s journey since his release from 
Guantanamo. He was one of 17 British nationals (including Moazzam Begg, the 
Tipton Three, Mohammed Emwazi - later known as Jihadi John - and Omar 
Deghayes) whose release from Guantanamo was negotiated by a New Labour 
government in 2004 (Quinn and Weaver, 2017). The then Home Secretary, 
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David Blunkett, asserted that he was confident that none of these men posed 
a security threat (Blunkett, 2017). Jamil al Harith was also one of four British 
plaintiffs represented by the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR) in New York 
in a bid to sue Donald Rumsfeld (the then US Secretary of State) for false 
imprisonment and torture at Guantanamo. The case was dismissed in 2009 but 
is linked to Meredith Tax (2013) and Karima Bennoune’s (2010) argument that, 
in representing jihadists as victims of state torture, CCR chose to overlook their 
participation in acts of terror.  
According to Harith’s sister, when he returned from Guantanamo in 2004, he 
struggled to find work. At some point he met and married Shukee Begum. She 
claimed that Harith was radicalised in 2013 after being affected by the plight 
of Syrians (McKee, 2017). That would be almost ten years after his return to 
the UK. From 2013 onwards, he was ensconced in a network of Manchester-
based jihadists through his contact with a key ISIS recruiter at the centre of 
that network, Raphael Hostey, known to ISIS as Abu Qaqa Al-Britaini. By 2014, 
just one year later, Harith had moved to ISIS controlled territory. A Channel 4 
interview with Shukee Begum revealed that Harith had travelled to Gaza and 
was ‘stopped and questioned by UK authorities for six hours’ when he tried to 
re-enter the country. She had thought he was ‘involved in the distribution of 
aid in al-Bab on the Iraq/Syria border and was ideologically opposed to suicide 
attacks’ but when he moved to ISIS territory she followed him (with her five 
children!) to try to convince him to return to the UK (ibid). 
The circle of Terror/Torture was quickly reproduced as civil society actors 
avoided any concrete discussion of the heinous ideology to which Harith had 
subscribed while government compensated for its own oversight by curtailing 
civil liberties. Theresa May re-introduced the same control orders that David 
Cameron had scrapped as part of Coalition brokering with the Liberal 
Democrats and moved quickly to a conversation about strengthening 
immigration laws to enable the deportation of jihadists – Theresa May’s pet 
project as then Home Secretary - and rescinding citizenship to British nationals 
in Syria and Iraq to prevent them from returning to the UK, even where they 
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felt remorse and disillusion with joining ISIS, and irrespective of whether they 
had committed any crimes.vii 
Harith’s personal-political journey and the noise around it, raises a number of 
issues that are pertinent to an understanding of the current Prevent landscape. 
This was a man at the apex of both torture and terror. His story is a stark 
reminder of the globalised enmeshing of local, national, international, real, 
lived and virtual worlds through intense time-space compression, that in turn 
pose significant challenges to the purview of British state powers. The daily 
experience of humiliation, violence and abuse that he incurred at 
Guantanamo, his insights into US and UK security services, army and police 
officers must have impacted his world view.viii However, while his family stated 
that he was forever changed by his experience at Guantanamo and his wife 
claimed that he was radicalised by the injustices of the Syrian conflict in 2013, 
alternative accounts suggest a radicalisation narrative that spanned thirty 
years.   
The reasons why Harith was ever in Afghanistan back in 2001 remain unclear. 
This is not dissimilar to the cases of other British men that were initially 
deemed ‘enemy combatants’ and later freed from Guantanamo (such as 
Moazzam Begg) who anti-racist, left and human rights groups portrayed as 
‘perfect victims’ (Sahgal, 2010) of western imperial powers until Gita Sahgal 
(2010), Karima Bennoune (2010), Meredith Tax (2013), Chetan Bhatt (2017), 
and members of Women Against Fundamentalism pointed to the many ways 
in which they had been, and continue to be, involved in Islamist networks. This 
was reflected, for instance, in their trips to countries that map directly on to 
the Islamist geo-political narrative (Bhatt, 1997) calling on true Muslims to 
engage in ‘defensive jihad’ (Bhatt, 2017). Harith allegedly accompanied Abu 
Bakr (a key Al Qaeda operative) to Sudan as far back as 1994! He then claims 
to have been ‘picked up’ by the Taliban in 2001 for trying to cross from a 
‘religious retreat’ in Pakistan through a post 9/11 war-torn Afghanistan to 
reach Iran! (see Rawlinson, 2017). At some point in the mid 2000s, he was 
stopped by intelligence officers on his way back from Gaza.  
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There is also another twist to the story:  a suggestion that Harith was detained 
by the US because he could offer insider information on the Taliban. These are 
Homeland-esque machinations that are compounded by Lord Carlile’s (the 
man responsible for reviewing terrorism legislation) assertions that there was 
likely always to have been an understanding that Harith was a jihadist and the 
compensation awarded to him in 2010 was an attempt to hold onto national 
security data rather than a genuine view that Harith was not a jihadist. Pragna 
Patel’s (2019) article in this Special Issue points to similar machinations that 
enable the kinds of narrative lapses and contradictions that exacerbate rather 
than chip away at the Terror/Torture circle of abuse and indignity. The only un-
established fact is whether Harith became entrapped by jihadists or whether 
he pro-actively aligned himself with fundamentalists in spite of his experience 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
Media and right wing outrage focused on the compensation Harith was 
awarded and this undermined his very real experience of torture. On the other 
hand, Jamil al Harith’s activities are a mirror on left/anti-racist critiques of 
Prevent and radicalisation theses. In a process not dissimilar to the anti-racist 
defence of Moazzam Begg and absolute resistance to the exposition of 
Birmingham-based jihadist networks nurtured and cemented over two 
decades (see Tax, 2013; Bhatt, 2017), a Letter to The Guardianix accused the 
newspaper of racial profiling and pathologisation after one of its journalists (an 
Asian/Muslim woman from the north of England) produced an investigative 
piece detailing Islamist networks in South Manchester (see Parveen, 2017). 
She identified 16 ISIS recruits from within 2.5 miles of Harith’s home, including 
the notorious ISIS enlister Raphael Hostey, who was killed by a drone attack in 
Syria in 2016. Hostey and Harith were good friends. Hostey was also friends 
with Salman Abedi, the suicide bomber who killed 22 people at Manchester 
Arena just weeks after Harith’s suicide mission in Mosul. Harith and Hostey 
were also acquaintances of Salma and Zahra Halane, twin sisters that travelled 
to Syria to become ‘jihadi brides’. The report suggests that histories of 
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belonging previously associated with gangs have given way to networks 
organised around particular ISIS recruiters. 
Despite all this, the letterx  from two academics and a youth worker, received 
wide circulation among anti-racist academics and activists on social media. The 
authors of the letter state:  
The government’s misunderstanding has been to claim that 
radicalisation is the main cause of terrorist violence. Often known as 
the “conveyor belt theory”, it states that extreme interpretations of 
belief systems offer the best explanations for why people commit acts  
of violence. This has been largely discredited by most mainstream 
academics (with a link to Arun Kundnani’s Claystone Report) as it 
ignores the role of structural violence: racism, poverty, vulnerability, 
foreign interventions etc. – often the products of state policy. 
This Letter is an archetypal underscoring of respecting rights and the total side 
lining of the duty to ensure rights. In my view it is also emblematic of the way 
that a range of academics round on anyone that meets with government to 
discuss responses to fundamentalism. In fact, by completely ignoring the 
reality of fundamentalist mobilisations in Manchester, the authors are not 
respecting the rights of those millions of people, mostly Muslims, that feel the 
full force of fundamentalist violence on a daily basis. 
Moreover, the point about ‘mainstream academics’ links to a report by Arun 
Kundnani (2015). Obviously this statement shifts the onus from fundamentalist 
activism to state policy. The same circles are silent on the 16 ISIS recruits and 
Islamist networks that must have developed in the area and gone 
unchallenged for decades. Other than an essay on South Manchester by Kenan 
Malik (2017), there were no left or anti-racist letters of opprobrium and 
concern about the extent and embeddedness of fundamentalist activity in 
minority neighbourhoods.  
At this point, one does have to ask - why isn’t the recruitment of men and 
women to terrorist networks, and the impact on universal human rights, a 
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cause for concern for these anti-racist activists and academics? Moreover, as 
Gita Sahgal asked of me recently, why is it that anti-racists work with network 
analyses of fascist activists but proclaim state conspiracy and underscore 
infringements of civil liberties when others urge us to look closely at jihadist 
networks? 
In a twisted push back against all radicalisation theses, Arun Kundnani would 
have us believe that it is the British state rather than fundamentalist activism 
that is responsible for perfectly ‘nice’ young men and women becoming 
terrorists.xi In fact Kundnani never describes jihadists as terrorists but 
frequently speaks of state terrorism. If the cause is state policies, it follows that 
for Kundnani (and the many left/anti-racists that follow his line of argument) 
the way to tackle fundamentalism is to focus on rectifying state policies, 
particularly British foreign policy.  
There is little space to get into the dominant radicalisation theses here but, as 
noted above, there are flaws with the VAF approach, it’s myopic focus on 
individual psychology and behaviour when a leading expert on radicalisation, 
Peter Neumann, has identified over 200 personal and political conditions that 
could potentially push people towards fundamentalist formations (Brown, 
2017). It feels to me that the VAF pales into insignificance when one looks at 
the personal-political journey of Jamil al Harith. Conversely, a rights based 
approach would actively challenge all mobilisations that seek to dismantle 
others’ rights and it would support projects that are engaged with fighting for 
universal human rights, whether this is local women’s organisations or secular 
anti-racist projects. 
In the context of Manchester, Kenan Malik (2017) provides an important 
personal insight - his political trajectory was vastly different to Jamil al Harith, 
he argues, because of the anti-racist and class based progressive social 
movements that marked his youth, a context that has been in sharp decline 
for some years. Given this, is it not equally possible that the decline of secular 
anti-racist or trade union activism and/or complicity in strengthening the hand 
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of religious identity politics and communal projects, is also part of the 
problem? 
Moreover, as Karima Bennoune (2008) points out, the term ‘terrorism’ 
remains controversial among left, anti-racist and civil liberties activists even 
though there are clear definitions of both terror and torture within 
international law and it is not accurate to claim, as some human rights 
organisations have done, that ‘the term terrorism is without legal significance’. 
Bennoune cites the 2004 definition established by the UN High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Changes as:  
Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing 
conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and 
Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death 
or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the 
purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international 
organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act... 
[as cited in Bennoune, 2008: 20] 
While Bennoune contends with the shortcomings of this definition,  including  
‘the exclusion of state conduct from the scope of the definition’ (2008:21), she 
maintains that it is not correct for international human rights organisations and 
left activists to claim that there is no agreement on how to define ‘terrorism’. 
She notes that, at least until the date of her article, Amnesty International were 
writing the word terrorism in quotation marks in order to emphasise the lack 
of international agreement on the use of the term. This was underscored by 
their adoption of the line that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter’. While there are clear examples of the ways that states use 
the phrase ‘terrorism’ to pathologise and root out oppositionxii, there has been 
a long period of international human rights organisations refusing to, 
categorically, denounce the actions of Muslim fundamentalist groups.  
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Moreover, this is not the case for the British government’s list of proscribed 
terrorist organisations – whatever you may think of the word ‘terrorist’ and in 
lieu of an urgent debate about proscription, most of the organisations on the 
government’s list (as of September 2018), are supremacist groups intent on 
embedding fear and terrorising civilians. If anything, the list does not go far 
enough in terms of the full range of fundamentalist organisations operating 
within the UK that present themselves as respectful (‘integrated’ into civic, 
political and electoral systems) while they fund, support, advocate and their 
members and leaders engage with acts of violence across the globe. 
 
However, the state does not make any distinctions between forms of non-state 
political violence and this is where we need to foreground and develop our 
own feminist ethics. For the British state, Britons recruited to fight ISIS by 
organisations outside of the British army are placed on the same terrorism-
radicalisation footing as those that join ISIS. So in the British government’s 
view, Anna Campbell’sxiii armed resistance alongside the progressive YPJ (the 
Kurdish Women’s Protection Units) in Rojava would be subject to the same 
terms of reference as Jamil al Harith’s suicide bomb for ISIS. Clearly there is an 
ethical problem with this and we need to find ways of distinguishing between 
violence perpetrated in the name of authoritarian supremacist projects and 
that perpetrated to resist such projects. Feminist ethics needs to help us cut 
through the claim that Muslim fundamentalists are the same as Irish 
nationalists fighting British colonialism or South Africans fighting apartheid 
(see Tax, 2013 for more on the many ways that fundamentalists are not anti-
imperialists). 
 
Security vs securitisation  
On 22nd March 2017, 52 year old Khalid Masood rented a large car and drove 
it at high speed at pedestrians walking on the pavement of Westminster Bridge 
killing four people and injuring another 32 (Anderson, 2017). Masood dumped 
his car then ran across the road to New Palace Yard where he stabbed an 
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unarmed officer. Masood was shot dead by another police officer just inside 
the gates of the Palace of Westminster. Born Adrian Russell Elms, he had 
converted to Islam while he was in prison. He was known to MI5 as a 
‘peripheral figure’ in a plot to bomb the base of the territorial army in Luton in 
2010 but the police claim that he was not considered a threat and he had not 
been charged with any terrorist offences. Between 2010 and 2012 he worked 
for a language school in Luton where the manager claimed he came across as 
apolitical (‘integrated’?) and rarely expressed anger but he did feature as part 
of police intelligence on Al Mouhajiroun networks. Although the Islamic State 
were quick to claim the attack, there was little evidence to suggest any direct 
links between Masood and ISIS. For all intents and purposes this was a man 
that acted alone out of a strident belief in a particular ideology, using as 
ammunition items that are readily available to adults in the UK.  
 
Exactly two months later, Salman Abedi walked into the foyer of Manchester 
Arena, towards the end of a concert by Ariana Grande. He was carrying a 
rucksack containing a home made bomb filled with shrapnel. He positioned 
himself by parents and family members who were waiting to collect children 
and young people at the concert. He detonated the bomb as hundreds of 
people poured out of the concert. The blast itself killed the people in his 
immediate vicinity but the shrapnel enabled him to injure people as far as 80 
metres from where he was standing. Abedi killed 22 people. Another 116 
people required hospital treatment (Anderson, 2017). Half of those killed were 
under 20 years of age, the youngest was just 8 years old. The majority were 
girls and young women, representative of Grande’s white western female teen 
following. By targeting a concert by this specific artist, Abedi was making an 
ideological statement about pop culture and expressions of female sexuality. 
Since he did not leave a definitive statement about his actions it is difficult to 
know his intention, but his target and his timing appeared to fit clearly with 
the ISIS call for Muslims around the world to use the month of Ramadan to 
demonstrate their opposition to western values. 
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Just two weeks later, on a warm Saturday evening (3rd June 2017), still in the 
period of Ramadan, another three men, Khuram Bhatt (aged 27), Rachid 
Redouane (aged 30), and Youseff Zaghba (age 22) drove a hired white van into 
groups of people on London Bridge. The van was loaded with home-made 
Molotov cocktails. After driving into pedestrians on London Bridge, the three 
jumped out and, armed with large knives, they set upon people in nearby 
Borough Market. They killed 8 people and injured 45 (Anderson, 2017) before 
being shot dead by police officers. Here the focus was not specifically on a 
group of women, but it was clearly a response to ISIS calls to use the Ramadan 
period to show contempt for ‘western’ values, which they actioned by 
targetting bars and nightlife. 
At the height of attention to Islamist attacks, a 47 year old white man, Darren 
Osborne, went to Wales and hired a van which he drove back over night. He 
headed straight to the Finsbury Park Islamic Centre where large numbers of 
Muslims had gathered to break their fast. Osborne drove his van into a 
pedestrian, killing him at the scene. He injured 10 others. He was remanded by 
other worshippers and handed over to the police.  
 
All four of the above events were classed as acts of terrorism. 
 
Despite the continued denial and displacement by many non-state actors, 
terrorism involves a series of violations of human rights. As Bennoune (2008) 
makes clear, terrorism has the potential to: 
(V)iolate human rights across all categories: civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights, as well as individual and group rights, 
women’s rights and children’s rights. Those rights most often affected 
include the fights to life and to security of person, the fights to be free 
from torture and ill-treatment and arbitrary detention, the right to 
humane treatment, the right to be free from discrimination, the rights 
to be free from violence against women and to free consent in 
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marriage, the rights to freedoms of opinion and expression and 
assembly and conscience and religion and belief and movement, the 
fights to take part in public affairs and to vote, the right to health, the 
right to education, the right to work, the fight to take part in cultural 
life, the right to protection of the family, the right to development, and 
the right to peace (2008:41). 
Moreover, a human rights perspective ‘can illuminate aspects not highlighted 
in governmental security discourses’ such as the imposition of dress codes and 
marriage codes (Bennoune, 2008:40). Bennoune and members of Women 
Against Fundamentalism (WAF) have fought over many years for public 
recognition of the specific gender dimensions to fundamentalist, racist and 
communal attacks. 
In the wake of the 2017 attacks and also because of the attention to ‘jihadi 
brides’ and the sexual violence perpetrated by ISIS, the gender dimensions of  
‘extremism’ began to be foregrounded. However, these discussions have been 
far from clear and there’s still a lot of thinking to be done on this. 
Unfortunately, there is little space to get into detail but I want to end this paper 
by making three key points on gender that speak to the need for a clear 
feminist distinction between security and securitisation. 
Firstly, there has been a move to diagnose the problem of fundamentalism as 
one of patriarchal power relations. References to ‘toxic masculinity’xiv, 
‘misogyny’xv and ‘gender terrorism’xvi in relation to the events of 2017 and the 
eight men involved in perpetrating those events are clearly a means for 
highlighting the connections between their personal histories of violence 
against women, their affiliation with fundamentalist and racist political views 
and the specific targetting of women and girls. Indeed Bennoune (2008) also 
used the phrase ‘gender-based terrorism’ to refer to the specific forms – like 
attacks on reproductive rights and on sexual health clinics – that are clearly 
targetting women’s rights. This connects with aspets of the term ‘sexual 
terrorism’ coined by Carole Sheffield (1995) around three decades back in 
order to expand the notion of terrorism so that it takes account of rape culture 
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and sexual harassment and the way that fear and threats to personal security 
and bodily autonomy are a key mechanism for enabling male control over 
women.  
To think of security in relation to the right to be free from this threat of and 
actual harm, is an important invocation of human rights values, particularly the 
notion of security as a human right. As an extension of this, Bennoune’s (2008) 
calls for security proponents ‘to expand their notion of safety to include 
fundamental aspects of human rights, including the right to be free from 
torture’ (page 9).  In practice this means we work with expanded notions of 
security that cover the torture inflicted by non-state actors and push against 
attempts to inflict torture or compromise rights (freedom of movement, bodily 
autonomy, the right to life) in the name of fighting terrorism. To sustain the 
universality of human rights requires a deep commitment to human dignity 
(Bennoune, 2008: 9). 
Having said that, the current discussion in the UK of patriarchy and 
fundamentalism feels reductive. We can easily lose sight of a radical 
universalist approach to Terror/Torture by reducing everything to patriarchy. 
For instance, male dissidents are targetted by fundamentalists – how does 
patriarchy help us to understand that and to respect/ensure their rights? 
Moreover, not all men exposed to violence and abuse, or all misogynists, or 
indeed all male perpetrators of domestic abuse, then go on to subscribe to 
fundamentalist ideologies let alone commit acts of mass violence. Perhaps 
what we could argue is that the bodily autonomy and security of women and 
girls is indicative of conducive contexts for fundamentalist and other right wing 
mobilisations?  
Secondly, as WAF and others in the UK have maintained, women and girls are 
at the forefront of tackling fundamentalism. Yet when women and girls sit 
down at the table with government to talk about tackling fundamentalism they 
are accused of being co-opted by a surveillance state, of giving way to state 
over reach and of fuelling anti-Muslim racism, even now when the 
government’s counter-extremism agenda is so obviously fixed on white 
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supremacist groups (see Haroon-Iqbal and Rehman articles in this Issue). As 
WAF has known since its birth in 1989, women speaking out on Muslim 
fundamentalism in particular are de-legitimised by minority communities. For 
instance, Hifsa Haroon-Iqbal and Yasmin Rehman (in this Issue) point to the 
way that they are accused of not being Muslim enough to speak on the issue. 
The fact is that women that engage with the state to underline its role in 
ensuring the rights of its citizens, including the human right to security, bodily 
autonomy and freedom of expression, are accused of supporting a post 9/11 
‘securitisation’ agenda (see Fekete, 2006). 
Having said that, my final point brings us to the murkiest part of the discussions 
on Prevent. By speaking of ‘gender terrorism’ in relation to child sexual 
exploitation, honour based violence and Muslim fundamentalism and not 
other forms of violence, it is being applied to acts of violence perpetrated by 
BME men. It is in this way that the phrase runs the risk of sitting more closely 
to securitisation (as protection of the nation-state, it’s monocultural 
characteristics and its monopoly on violence) than to security as a human 
rights value. 
Moreover, it is difficult to dismiss concerns about securitisation when David 
Cameron (2011) ushered the Conservatives back in to power by presenting a 
critique of multiculturalism at an international security conference and calling 
it ‘muscular liberalism’, when counter-terrorism money is used to fund CCTV 
cameras in majority BME areas in Birmingham, when ‘security services overlap 
with community engagement teams’ so much so that a counter terrorism 
police officer is seconded into the council’s Equalities Division (O’ Toole, et al., 
2015), when conversations about immigration are not too far from 
conversations about tackling extremism, and when there is a constant lobby 
to extend police powers – the fact that Khalid Masood sent a WhatsApp 
message before he murdered people on Westminster Bridge led to a renewed 
pitch to extend police powers so that they can access all private WhatsApp 
messages, a clear infringement on the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression and thought. 
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The police role has been the single most problematic and misunderstood issue 
in relation to the polarisation of debate on Prevent. The anti-Prevent lobby 
may rely on the misrepresentation of Pursue cases as Prevent cases and the 
mass reproduction of these myths (see Parker et al; London ESOL teacher, in 
this Issue) but this much is true, the 2015 guidance makes clear that the police 
are at the centre of Channel’s work – the Channel Police Practitioner (CPP) or 
dedicated police Channel co-ordinator is tasked with co-ordinating activity ‘by 
requesting relevant information from panel partners about a referred 
individual’ and responsible for making the initial assessment based on a 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF). Once compiled, this information 
is passed to a Channel Panel that is chaired by the relevant local authority and 
tasked with drawing up a tailored support plan for Channel cases whose 
progress is then reviewed on a three month basis. As Rahila Gupta (2015) has 
pointed out, statutory workers sit on ‘Channel panels, a multi-agency forum 
heavily populated by crime enforcement agencies: police, immigration 
officials, border force, prison officers, youth offending services’.  
However, when critics of the central place of the police are asked what the role 
of policing should be in relation to preventing terrorism, there is a deafening 
silence. Several people I have spoken with have tentatively suggested, as has 
the youth and community studies expert Paul Thomas (2012),  that there 
should be an ‘intelligence - led’ approach to tackling terrorism. Yet this still 
leaves undetermined the precise distinction between intelligence gathering 
and surveillance. To come full circle and revert back to Bennoune for guidance, 
surely the key distinction is between policing in the interests of preventing 
violations of rights and policing with an interest to safeguard ‘statist concerns’ 
and/or the power of capital. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have adopted Karima Bennoune’s radical universalist approach 
to argue against a nationalist and a neo-liberal governance response to 
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fundamentalism in favour of a coherent human rights approach that requires 
us all, state and non-state actors, to recognise the human rights violations of 
both terror and torture. I have pointed to the many ways that the state 
response falls short – privileging loyalty to the state, working in partnership 
with some fundamentalists while condemning others, using anti-terror powers 
against protestors of all hues, and mobilising gender and equalities in nefarious 
ways. I have also pointed to the many ways that non-state actors – civil society 
organisations, human rights, civil liberties, left and anti racist groups – also fall 
short primarily by refusing to see and to challenge the human rights violations 
being committed by fundamentalists, primarily against minorities be they 
dissidents or women or children. The final section works through a discussion 
on women/girls to bring together the tensions between state over reach and 
civil society conspiracy theories. There are many unanswered questions, but 
to raise questions is itself an important starting point for debate.  
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